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MAPUTO: CAPITAL OF MOZAMBIQUE*
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GEORGE KAY
In the fifteenth century Portugal was an influential state; and filled with 
zeal to win souls for Christ, power for their country and wealth for them­
selves, the Portuguese embarked on a series of exploratory and imperial 
missions which took them across both the Atlantic and Indian oceans* In 
1498 Vasco da Gama reached the tiny coral island of Mozambique, 5 km off 
the coast of East Africa; and in 1507 it was fortified to serve as a perm­
anent base* During the sixteenth century it became the most important port- 
of-call between Lisbon and India; a 'rich bustling replica of a metropolitan 
Portuguese town1 (Duffy, 1962) which justified the construction over some 40 
years and in stone from Portugal of the massive fortress of San Sebastian* 
When Fort Jesus, on Mombasa Island, finally fell to the Arabs in 1698 the 
town of Mozambique became the seat of government and unrivalled centre of 
Portuguese power in East Africa until, 200 years later, developments in the 
African interior shifted the centre of growth so dramatically that the 
estwhile capital virtually fossilised overnight to survive as a remarkable 
• momento of bygone days*
Delagoa Bay, 1600 km away at the southern limit of Portugal 1 s East African 
territory, was the new focus of attention. It was not without a history of 
its own. Discovered in 1502 by one of da Gama's ships, it was explored in 
1544 by Louren<jo Marques, a Portuguese trader who negotiated treaties with 
local chiefs for regular visits to buy ivory- Strongholds were established, 
at first on islands in the bay (Inhaca and Xefina) and later at Catembe on
♦Mozambique, erstwhile colony and overseas province of Portugal, became 
independent in June 1975 and renamed its capital, Maputo* Previously known 
as Lourenijo Marques this city is essentially a creation of Portuguese 
colonial settlement; and this essay.traces its origins and development and 
places an analysis of its morphology and character in this historical 
context* It is therefore primarily an essay on Maputo's antecedents and 
heritage; it illuminates past policies and processes and their outcome 
which are not only of interest on their own account but also because they 
provide the necessary background for any appreciation of Maputo and its 
future* Some introductory comment on recent and contemporary issues is 
provided by way of conclusion; but nevertheless even the least discerning 
reader will recognise that the title is something of a misnomer*
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the south bank of the Rio do Espirito Santo. It became a regular port-of- 
call for passing ships and a trading post with well established connections 
with the interior from whence there emerged a steady if unspectacular flow 
of ivory and, later, of slaves; most of the latter probably left on French 
rather than Portuguese vessels. It was a point of sufficient importance to 
attract the Dutch in 1721 but their rival settlement was abandoned in 1732.
An Austrian trading company established themselves on the bay in 1771 but 
they were expelled by the Portuguese in 1781. In that year the persistent 
Portuguese appointed a military governor to this southern outpost and he 
constructed a fort and settlement on the north bank of the Espirito Santo 
(Gordon-Brown, 1960). That settlement, Lourenijo Marques - sustained by the 
presence of military officialdom, a church and priest, and with maize and 
cinchona bark from Portugal's Trans-Atlantic possessions - survived to become 
a major port and city and the capital of Mozambique.
Its future was not always secure. It was looted and largely destroyed by 
the French in 1796, but rebuilt by 1800. In the. 1820's a British survey ship, 
with its commander and company vociferously opposed to slavery and the slave 
trade raised the Union Jack on the southern shores of Delagoa Bay, and there­
after an Anglo-American whaling company operated spasmodically from there.
A little later, Boer trekkers in search of new homelands ranged as far north 
as the Limpopo; and the famous but unfortunate trek-leader, Louis Trichardt 
and some of his followers died in Louren^o Marques in 1838. Increasingly 
during the nineteenth century Portuguese East Africa fell under the avaricious 
scrutiny of other powers, notably Britain and Germany. By then Portugal, 
politically insignificant and financially weak, 'could only maintain her 
position by playing off one power against the other' (v.arhurst, 1962). The 
great powers, each as anxious to prevent their rivals' expansion as to pursue 
their own, were susceptible to such tactics. Consequently, Portugal was able 
to survive almost continuous hostile diplomatic intrigue and retain control 
over 2600 km of the East African coastline and over 783 000 km2 of adjacent 
territory. An important factor in this success and in the subsequent develop­
ment of Mozambique was the role of a new vigorous generation of colonial 
leaders, typified by Antonio Enes - 'a romantic turned positivist', who 
dedicated themselves to the revival of Portugal's civilising mission in 
Africa. Ironically, much of their nationalistic determination was derived 
from being in opposition to greater powers (Duffy, 1962).
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Development in Delagoa Bay was directly influenced by international affairs.
The wrangle between 8ritain and Portugal over territorial rights on the bay 
was submitted to arbitration in 1875 and President MacMahon of France ruled 
in favour of Portugal. Had he done otherwise, a British Colonial town, 
another Durban or Lagos, might have emerged rather than the distinctively 
Portugese metropolis of Louren^o Marques. That any city should develop 
was caie almost entirely to needs generated in the interior and notably, in 
she first instance, in the Transvaal. There, the long-standing struggle for 
power between Bantu, Boer and Briton - native tribesman, pastoral colonist 
and urban uitlander, reached new and critical dimensions in 1886 when the 
world's largest known deposits of gold ore were discovered on the Witwaters— 
rand less than 100 km south .of Pretoria. Unlike earlier gold rushes, that 
to the 'Rand' was clearly destined to transform the economy and settlement 
pattern not only of the Transvaal but of southern Africa as a whole. Between 
May and September of 1886 more than 2500 miners had arrived; by 1890 there 
were 14 000 African employees at work in the southern Transvaal, and by 1900 
there were 100 000 (Christopher, 1976). The Transvaal urgently required 
ready access to ports capable of handling large quantities of goods and to 
copious supplies of labour. Furthermore, ICruger (President of the Transvaal, 
1883-1902) was anxious to reduce the dependence of the Afrikaner republics 
on British South Africa and, hopeful of retaining their autonomy, he looked 
to Delagoa Bay for cooperation and assistance. Although themselves heavily 
dependent upon British goodwill, the new Portuguese aspirants to imperial, 
splendour, entirely lacking resources other than their personal capabilities 
and their control of one of the finest harbours on the east coast of Africa, 
were only too willing to share the development and, indeed,, the administration 
of their colonial territory with foreign investors and chartered companies. 
Kruger was granted a concession to build a railway linking Pretoria and 
Johannesburg with Lourencjo Marques; and it was completed in 1894, within two 
years of the first train from Cape Town reaching the Rand (Day, 1963). This 
railway laid the foundation for the 'Mozambique Convention' which formalised 
relationships between South Africa and Mozambique in respect of three 
important matters. First, in terms of the 1909 agreement, it secured access 
to Louren^o Marques for South Africa provided that not less than 50 percent 
of all seaborne traffic generated by the southern Transvaal should pass 
through that port. Secondly, it granted the Witwatersrand Native Labour 
rights to recruit on short-term contracts up to 105 000 natives a year from 
southern Mozambique provided that a registration fee was paid to the Portuguese 
administration for each African recruited and payment of half of the employee's 
earnings was deferred until he returned home. Finally, and of relatively
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limited importance, it provided for free trade for the products of the soil 
and industries of both countries. First signed in 1909 and periodically 
revised thereafter this Convention remained in force throughout the colonial 
era (Gordon-Brown, 1960; Hance 1957; and Spence, 1963); it underpinned the 
growth and prosperity of Lourenqo Marques.
Development in Africa accelerated rapidly after the Second World War and 
required greatly increased port capacity to sustain the trade thus generated. 
Beira, Mozambique's second port and city, found itself unable to cope with 
the growing traffic to and from the Rhodesias, Nyasaland and the Congo, (now 
Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zaire) so a new railway linking the Rhodesian 
network to Lourenco Marques was planned and completed by 1955. Ihis line 
not only added substantially to Lourenqo Marque' s hinterland but also 
fostered new rural developments within it, notably on irrigated estates in 
south-eastern Rhodesia specialising at first in sugar production and on 
settlement schemes in the Limpopo valley within Mozambique itself. The 
existing port facilities at Lourenco Marques were modernised and extended 
to include, inter alia, a terminal for the bulk handling of sugar and molasses 
and another for container traffic. No less important, new facilities were 
constructed a little way upstream at Matola specifically for the bulk—handling 
of specialized cargo, notably mineral ores from the Rhodesias and Swaziland, 
timber, crude oil and oil products; a quayside oil-refinery was built as part 
of the oil terminal. In short, the port of Lourenco Marques did more than 
hold its share of trade during the post-war era of growth*; and the city 
expanded accordingly*
Although primarily an international port, the growth of Lourenco Marques 
has not depended solely upon seaborne traffic. By 1880 it was evident that 
the ancient capital of Mozambique was ill-placed .in respect of contemporary 
and probable future developments affecting Portuguese East Africa. The 
conduct of governmental activity therefore shifted rapidly to Lourenco 
Marques and this fact was formally recognised in 1907 when the status of
*In 1962 Lourenqo Marques handled 1786 ships, receiving 2.9 M tons of goods 
and exporting 4.2 M tons. At that time approximately 65% of its trade was 
in transit traffic for South Africa and 17% for the Rhodesias; the remainder 
was shared between Swaziland and Mozambique (Spence, 1963). In 1970 the port 
handled 2064 ships, received 4.3 M tons of goods and exported 9.3 M tons 
(MHRTA, 1971).
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capital was conferred upon the new city* The seat of government inevitably 
attracts other high-order functions and Louren^o Marques quickly became the 
financial, commercial, ecclesiastical and, inter alia, the educational 
capital of Mozambique despite its location at the southern extremity of a 
very extensive territory. Furthermore, once established as the major urban 
concentration of population and of purchasing power it became the main 
attraction for all consumer-oriented manufacturing industry which proved to 
be an increasingly important source of wealth and employment after 1950. 
Finally, Louren<^o Marques was able to develop as a major resort catering 
successfully for a wide range of visitors including sailors and passengers 
from ships in port, international tourists and, most important of all, 
holiday-making White settlers and expatriates resident in South Africa and 
the Rhodesias# The city offered good value for money in the form of an 
attractive, exciting and in many ways exotic mixture of •Continental' and 
•African' atmospheres and experiences together with a variety of hotels 
and guest houses, restaurants arid night-clubs close to magnificent beaches 
with shark-free bathing and splendid opportunities for fishing and sailing 
around coral islands in a protected bay. However, like its port activities, 
such resort functions relate more to the position of the city in relation 
to the regional or international pattern of development in southern Africa 
than to the not inconsiderable assets of its site; and its reasonably 
balanced growth during the post-war decades continued to depend heavily 
upon factors ultimately beyond Portuguese control (Kay, 1969).
Like so many African capitals, once established as the primate city Louren^o 
Marques snowballed its way into an ever more dominant position within the 
urban rankings. Available population data allow only approximate compar­
isons'but these are instructive. By 1955 Louren^o Marques had a population 
of 100 000 which included 28 000 Europeans (or 43 percent of all Whites in 
Mozambique), 5800 Asians (38 percent of the total), and 8000 Coloured persons 
(27 percent of the total)*. At the same time Beira, the second city, had a 
population of 47 OCX)' including 10 000 Europeans, 3500 Asiatics and 2300 
Coloureds. In the following five years to 1960 the population of Lourencgo
*The 'European' or 'White* population was overwhelmingly of Portuguese stock; 
the 'Asiatic' population was mostly of Indian origins but included a substantial 
'Oriental' or Chinese minority; the 'Coloured' or 'Mixed* population included 
all persons of multi-racial origins most of whom were mulattos — the 
Portuguese term for this category was mesticos. Hance (1957) suggests that 
the population of Louren<jo Marques in 1954 was 110 000.
Marques increased by 84 percent to 183 798 including over 40 000 whites.
Beira also grew rapidly, but only by 26 percent to 59 329 (including 13 000 
Whites). However, it did more than consolidate its position as second 
city ahead of Quelimane (population c. 15 000), a mainland port and regional 
centre for the northern district of Zambezia, and of the former capital, 
Mozambique (population c. 12 000). Growth rates slackened somewhat during 
the sixties but the unequal competition continued. By 1970 the population 
of Louren(jo Marques was estimated to be in the region of 250 000 and to 
account for 75 percent of the total urban population of Mozambique. Following 
independence in 1975, new urbanisation policies and processes took effect; 
but urban growth and concentration appear to have continued and a recent 
estimate (World Bank, 1979) indicates that Maputo now has a population of 
more than 500 000 and that 83 percent of the country's urban population 
live in the capital.
Townscapes and urban spatial arrangements are largely a product of culture 
and history; they reflect the state of mind, the ambitions and achievements 
of those responsible for their creation and subsequent modification. Since 
cadastral frameworks and concrete reality generally are more enduring than 
the human value systems which brought them into being, it is almost inevitable 
that at any given time the existing fabric of a town is dated if not obsolete. 
Therefore, 'modernisation' - adaptation, renovation and even replacement - 
is necessarily an ongoing process, together with expansion to accommodate 
growth. It will also be evident that, whether affected from within a 
society (as, for example, by new technologies) or by transformation of the 
composition and structure of society itself, any rapid change in the dominant 
cultural values will cause a dislocation between town and townsfolk; and if 
rapid modernisation of the former in relation to the new aspirations of the 
latter is not possible an uncomfortable incongruity may persist.
Within this general context of human factors responsible for shaping urban 
features, the perception those in authority have of the people to be accom­
modated is particularly important; and in multi-racial societies the prevalent 
philosophy in respect of ethnic groups is as influential as that in relation 
to socio-economic classes. In such matters the general colonial policy of 
the Portuguese can best be described as one of Laissez-faire. Colour 
conciousness, though never so powerful as in neighbouring countries, and 
cultural differences generally conspired to keep the racial groups separate 
except in circumstances where economic forces drew them together. However,
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"the Portuguese did not find it necessary to create a network of legislation 
to recognise, reinforce and perpetuate racialist behaviour. On the contrary, 
with an established history of miscegenation and a substantial population of 
•Coloureds*! many of whom held important positions, it would have been both 
difficult and embarrassing-for them to do so. Towards the end of the nine­
teenth century, however, the Portuguese authorities were intensely nation­
alistic and measured both progress and merit in terms of their culture and 
values; there could be no question of equality for Africans until they had 
earned it through assimilation of appropriate life-styles- The native or 
indigenous peoples therefore remained under tribal law and special regulations 
while the * non—indi genous1 -population of Whites, Indians, Orientals and 
Coloureds - and any Africans able to emulate them - lived under the common 
law of Portugal, Everyone, of course, lived under * economic law*.
It was not the intention of the Portuguese to perpetuate this basic division. 
Their expressed hope was that the indigenous population should become 'civil­
ised* ; and in the thirties the two categories were re-styled 'Non-civilised' 
and 'Civilised* with assimilados, Africans who met difficult and stringently 
applied tests relating to cultural, economic and personal attributes, being 
admitted to the latter and to Portuguese citizenship. By the mid-fifties 
such terminology was proving embarrassing and was dropped; the small number 
of 'assimilated Africans' in Mozambique - 4554 amongst a total 'civilised* 
population of 55 451 in 1955 — also was embarrassing. Clearly the diffusion 
of 'civilisation' had not been particularly rapid. This was partly because 
Portugal was never able to afford philanthropy. Poverty ensured an austere 
paternalism and the provision of many civilising forces, including education, 
was necessarily left largely to churches, missions and other humanitarian 
organisations. However, the state did feel obliged to encourage if not 
require Africans 'to better themselves by work, to acquire through work the 
happiest means of existence, to civilise themselves through work . .
(Native-labour code of 1899, quoted by Duffy, 1962). This agent of civilis­
ation, of course, also helped in the development of the colonial economy; 
and it provided a place for Africans in the ports of Mozambique as well as 
the mining towns of the Transvaal. On the other hand, metropolitan Portugal 
- the poorest country in Europe - encouraged and helped poverty-stricken 
workers and peasants with limited education and skills to emigrate to her
*In 1940 the Coloured population of Mozambique numbered 15 641 and the 
White population, 27 438.
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overseas colonies® For example, regulations introduced in 1932 provided 
drastic restrictions on the immigration to and employment of ’foreign 
subjects* in Mozambique and required that in every commercial, industrial 
and agricultural undertaking at least 70 percent of the employees must be of 
Portuguese nationality (Gordon-Brown, I960)* With the advantages of their 
cultural .heritage, White Portuguese competed successfully for semi-skilled 
and even unskilled urban employment which might otherwise have fallen 
entirely to Africans, as it did in neighbouring territories where ’poor 
whites* were not welcome. Consequently, whereas in a typical British colonial 
town racial, cultural and socio-economic differences were inclined or even 
engineered to coincide and thus exaggerate divisions within society, in the 
Portuguese colonial town historic and economic circumstances and even colonial 
policies led to a less clearly defined and more flexible social structure - 
which included a substantial White working-class if not a proletariate.
In 1880 Lourenigo Marques was a small ’village* less than 700 m in length, 
huddled between a fortified palisade overlooking a swamp and the riverfront 
where a small castle defended the jetty and harbour; there was no deep-water • 
berth and ships anchored in the estuary. Half-a-dozen wagonways criss-- 
crossed its immediate hinterland and led to the interior; some few develop­
ments — commercial, agricultural or residential — preferred sites along 
these tracks above the bluff but mostly within 1500 m of the fort. A mission 
station with its church and hospital was the largest of them; and the new 
cemetery served well enough for the nineteenth century but it could satisfy 
neither the needs, of the foreseeable future not the aspirations of the 
. revitalised Portuguese administration. A new town was required;~and in 1887, 
in a style that British Enclosure Commissioners would have recognized with 
admiration, a new plan for the City of Louren^o Marques was drawn—up literally 
over that of the existing settlement.
The new plan was for a splendid Portuguese city of the future. A rectilinear 
network of wide avenues punctuated by spacious squares and circuses, nearly 
all bearing proud Portuguese names, was designed to cover an area some 2000 m 
by 1200 m. The probable persistence of the old town was acknowledged but 
provision was made for its integration with the new at the expense of some 
of its structure. It would also lose its immediate access to the riverside 
as a deepwater wharf was pushed out into the estuary across its entire 
frontage. The port and railway facilities were, of course, the raison d ’etre 
for growth so } then and subsequently they have been given-priority along the 
estuary where much land was to be reclaimed. (Fortunately for later
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developments, the attractive sea beaches are located quite separately on 
the shores of the bay). The railway was brought in to the western end of 
the old town to an imposing Station Square which was eventually and signif­
icantly re-nar.ied in a more prestigious style as Praca-MacMahon. Praca de 
Vasco da Gama was planned-as the civic centre, with a city hall flanked by 
government offices and the post office: by a high school, a trades and 
crafts school, a library and museum; and, strangely, by a reservoir. A 
whole block in.the north-west was set aside for a cathdral; but the existence 
of the church and hospital was respected. It was to be enhanced by an open 
- square giving direct access to an extensive ornamental and botanical garden 
and to Avenida Augusto de Castilho which formed the eastern limit of the 
grid. The cemetery’ also was respected and allocated a place on the northern 
■side of Avenida da Pinheiro Chagas. Other land uses scheduled for this 
northern perimeter included the military barracks, the prison, and an ' 
observatory together with five armoured bulwarks facing inland. The latter 
were not to be fanciful embellishments. At that time the Portuguese were 
under no illusion as to their tenuous control over their East African 
territory. In fact, in 1894 Loureni^o Marques ’suffered a serious assault 
by African warriors from the outlying areas' but the following year the local 
region was ruthlessly pacified (Duffy, 1962). This city was, of course, 
designed for a 'civilised' population. However, the need for Slack labour 
was recognised and adjacent to its western limit, just beyond a large block 
reserved for the police quarters, a small area was to be laid out with 
narrower roads bearing local names (such as Rua da Cherinaa) as a native 
quarter.
To plan on paper is one thing: to implement the design on the ground is
another. However, having wisely decided to accept, more or less, the old 
town as part of the new, the Portuguese were able to overcome most other 
alternative possibilities and to establish the greater part of their plan 
of 1887. There were some interesting if minor changes. The cathedral was 
eventually built upon land adjacent to the former church hospital; a 
magnificent city hall was built, but next door to the cathedral in Alburque- 
rque Square; the municipal market occupied the Praca de Vasco da Gama; 
and several short sections of the early roadways survived but without 
seriously affecting the overall plan. Also the municipality found it could 
not afford to provide all basic services. Thus, for example, in 1895 it 
granted a 50-year concession for the supply of water to E.F. Tissot Ltd; this 
was later taken over by the Delagoa Bay Development Company which had an 
active part in the growth of the city, and it was not until 1947 that the
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municipality assumed responsibility for the supply of water. In similar 
fashion, the city's electricity supply was handled by a concessionaire 
until 1947. Nevertheless, the administration succeeded during the nineties 
and later in creating a passable image of contemporary urban developments 
in metropolitan Portugal. The architectural forms and details were delib­
erately and distinctively Portuguese; and despite the poverty of the country 
it became a normal part of planning requirements for all large building 
projects that a small percentage of the total cost be specifically devoted 
to some cultural or aesthetic embellishments. The closely spaces multi­
dwelling buildings, including tall blocks of flats in later decades, and 
the mixture of residential with commercial and business functions in the 
city centre with the consequent down-town street-life were typically 'cont­
inental'. The wide, tree-lined avenues; the black and white cobbled mosaics; 
the neat gardens and nationalistic statues in city squares; the small formal 
parks; the pavement cafes, numerous bars, wine shops and late-opening 
general dealers in the city centre; all such details made the Portuguese 
feel at home and Anglo-saxon visitors aware of Latin culture. Although it 
may have had little immediate effect in diffusing their civilisation, the 
Portuguese were reasonably successful in transplanting their version of 
urban environments.
The principal failing of the planners of 1887, understandably, was their 
inability to foresee with any degree of accuracy the growth rates that 
were to befall their city. What appeared to be a spacious layout with 
ample room within for all possible expansion proved to be inadequate within 
twenty years. Consequently, the plans for particular land-uses on the 
periphery of the town’mostly were not implemented; and a drawing of c. 1904 
showed new extensions. By then it was clear that western extensions of the 
dock and railway facilities were necessary and land was reclaimed to admit 
these; eventually, by 1970 the single continuous deep-water wharf attained 
a length of more than 3000 m. The transfer of the seat of government 
required a Residence for the Governor-General and this was constructed on 
the headland where the estuary meets the bay, some 2 km. beyond the limit 
of the plan of 1887. The grid-iron street pattern was extended that far 
not only to give access to the governor's quarters but also to open-up the 
Polana suburb overlooking the beaches. A new hospital and, a little later, 
a prestigious high school to serve the city region were built in this high- 
class eastern section of the city. The drawing also shows in somewhat 
open-ended and diagrammatic fashion,a northern extension of the grid pattern
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to add five more east-west avenues, apparently not so much in the form of a 
definitive plan but as an indication that the probable need to cater for 
growth was acknowledged* No recognition of the existence of or need to plan 
for indigenous African workers was shown, not even beyond these speculative 
city limits* Eventually, in the course of time, these five avenues did 
appear on the ground though numerous elements of the early wagonways also 
survived; and, perhaps in a defiant gesture against future growth and a 
reminder of the city’s origins, much of the outer one - Avenida Caldas 
Xavier — was constructed in an arc centred on the ancient Fort of Our Lady 
of the Immaculate Conception# This, however, failed to circumscribe 
growth, and in spite of considerable infilling within the urban area further 
.lateral expansion occurred, especially after the Second World War•
In particular, expensive residential developments occurred in the Polana 
suburb and other eastern areas; and resort functions spread along the sea­
front as far north as the Costa do Sol beach. Inland, in the north-east 
sector suburbs of high-rise buildings and other more or less anonymous 
styles of high-density low-cost housing sprang up, some built by developers 
but much provided by housing cooperatives and government agencies. On the 
main road to the international airport the Praca de Touros emerged as a 
late reminder, if any was needed, that Lourenco Marques was an Iberian 
city; but beyond that tourist attraction and symbol of Portugues city life 
lay the vast expanse of largely unplanned, ill-serviced, spontaneous peri­
urban growth of mostly self-built shanty housing - the bairros indigenas, 
more recently styled the bairros populares. Some of the major employers 
provided at their works large barrack—style accommodation with full services 
often including meals, for their single African employees. The municipality 
also provided some low-cost housing ouside the city proper, notably to the 
south of the airport, for rent to Africans with jobs in town. But poverty 
and their laissez-faire tradition prevented the government, municipality 
and, in most cases, the employers from assuming responsibility for housing 
low-income workers - be they Slack, Brown or White though,of course, the' 
vast majority were native Africans. Consequently, most Africans coming to 
live in the city, whether temporarily or permanently and as employees or 
own—account workers, bad to fend for themselves. Their very considerable 
contribution to the city was the organic sprawl of single-storey simple 
buildings with a maze of footpaths and cycle tracks and a few motorable if 
unsurfaced roads as its circulatory system. Such shanty settlements and the 
associated informal economy, which includes some elaborate and colourful
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markets, were always tolerated by the Portuguese who could afford to do no 
other. In expounding their grand design for the long-term future they saw 
no place for such uncivilized poverty; it should pass away. Meanwhile, 
harsh realities had to be accepted; and provided law and order, health and 
a modicum of happiness prevailed, there seemed no reason to take action 
against these bairros indigenas. Indeed they were an essential though not, 
to Portuguese eyes and still less to British eyes, an attractive part of 
the city. Some control over their growth was necessary but no rigorous 
action seems to have been employed against them and it is probable that 
indirect control was maintained through regulations such as that forbidding 
any African other than an assimilado from travelling without permission 
outside his home district. Sven so, it seems likely that during the latter 
decades of Portuguese rule perhaps a half of the population of the capital 
city lived in peri-urban shanties.
11 was a matter of policy and a consequence of generally low standards of 
living that the city should be compact and population densities high. The 
whole of Louren^o Marques proper can be encompassed within a radius of 4 km; 
and economies of space and of movement are thus effected. For example, the 
population as a whole became largely dependent upon and supportive of the 
municipal transport system for travelling distances that they could not 
easily walk; and by the mid-sixties municipal buses carried, on average,
1 685 000 passengers per month. In such matters, as in many others, the 
Portuguese colonial city offers marked contrasts with the space-hungry sprawl 
of urban areas developed under British rule. However, greater Loureni^o 
Marques did become a complex city; it incorporates several subsidiary urban 
areas which, for various geographical and historical reasons, have developed 
and continue to function largely as independent entities, deference has been 
made above to the linear extension of resort functions along the sea-front. 
Across the estuary some suburban development has occurred at the historic 
site of Catembe and beyond; but with only a limited passenger ferry service 
to the city, growth in that direction is severely handicapped. The principal 
extensive and relatively low density spread of bairros indigenas and, at 
Vila Salazar and Matola township, of fairly prosperous suburbs lies to the 
west of the Infulene river and extends to the Matola river. The basic reason 
for this large addition to the urban complex has been the port and industrial 
activities at Matola; but this western area is not self-contained and the 
city does face some problems of integration. In this context it is interest­
ing to note that the very large, prestigious sports complex and football
12
stadium, built in 1968, is just to the west of the Infulene on a major 
arterial intra-city road and near the geographical rather than the historical 
or cultural centre of the city complex as a whole. _
When Mozambique became independent in 1975, Lourenijo Marques became Maputo, ■ 
the capital of an African Socialist Republic. It is not the city that Frelimo 
would have built. The flagrant display of Portuguese culture is particularly 
irksome, partly because it is foreign but largely because it is seen as a 
symbol of colonialism. Many of the superficial alien features could be 
quickly eradicated or modified; and the early nationalisation of all funeral 
parlours and undertakers was a direct assault on Portuguese culture rather 
than an important step in an economic strategy. . But the layout of the city 
and its basic architecture, like the J’ortuguese language, are things that 
Maputo must learn to live with. And, in fact, in terms of plan, morphology 
and townscape, Maputo's heritage is much more in keeping with independent- 
Third '.vorld urbanization processes than that. bequeathed by many colonial 
capitals. Zambia, for example, inherited more serious difficulties in 
Lusaka (Davies, 1972). Maputo's most immediate problems lay not so much 
with the city per se but with the international basis of much of its economy.
First, partly because of the bitter struggle for independence and the 
dramatic capitulation by metropolitan Portugal without a reasonable trans­
ition period and partly because Frelimo policies seemed to offer no place 
for a Portuguese life-style, Mozambique and Maputo in particular suffered 
a very rapid and large-scale loss of Europeans; Murphree (1978) estimated ' 
that scarcely one-tenth of the White population‘stayed on after independence. 
The urban economy had relied heavily upon the managerial, professional and 
technical skills, and even the labour, of many Whites; and until their loss 
can be made good the efficient operation of the port and city will continue 
to be impaired. Secondly, whereas the Portuguese had developed and maintained 
close ties with South Africa and, in spite of the U.N. call for sanctions, 
had also continued to support and supply Rhodesia after its unilateral 
decleratibn of independence, Frelimo put Mozambique into the 'front line' 
states of Slack Africa resolutely opposed to White rule in southern Africa. 
This altered quite markedly economic relationships on which the country and 
Maputo in particular depended very heavily. In March 1976 Mozambique closed 
its border with Rhodesia, and while unable to take such abrupt action with 
South Africa it adapted a cool hostility towards that country. South Africa's 
response was reciprocal; while willing and anxious to continue relations 
that are to her advantage or of mutual benefit, South Africa has no wish to
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be dependent upon any Black state. With the construction of a new major 
port at Richards Bay well advanced and an increasing surplus of labour 
within her borders,' she has been able to reduce traditional links with 
Mozambique quite rapidly to the point at which she could disengage without 
serious effects' to herself. At the same time, South Africa was able and 
willing to increase trade with Mozambique and especially to supply gaps, 
left in her markets by the break with Portugal and by declining domestic 
production, notably of foodstuffs. —
The net effects of such changes together with those of rising oil prices 
and a world-wide recession have had serious consequences for Maputo. By 
1976 ‘with a reduction in the transit trade, total tonnage handled by 
Maputo fell by 70 percent; . . .  tourism had ceased; • . . and the recruit­
ment (by South Africa) of migrant labour from Mozambique was sharply down 
. . .  with the result that earnings from this source fell by about half* 
(Abercor, 1978). Whereas the average annual growth of the GDP in 1960-70 
had been +4.6 percent, in the period 1970-77 it fell to -5.0 percent, and 
most of the decline occurred after independence; for the same periods, the 
average annual growth rate for domestic investment shifted from +6.3 percent 
to -11.0 percent; and inflation rates tripled (World Bank,. 1979). The decline 
continued; but by I960 there were hopeful signs. Following independence 
for Zimbabwe steps were taken to re-establish connections with that country 
and others beyond which could prove to have direct benefits for Maputo and 
Beira. Also, harsh economic realities had led to modifications of inter­
national relations as a whole and Mozambique was actively seeking the 
cooperation of all neighbouring states and many Western, countries in the 
difficult task of economic reconstruction and development. There were 
already signs of a slight recovery; in any case conditions could hardly get 
worse (Abercor, 1980). Maputo, however, faces enormous problems because 
throughout this period of economic deterioration ••.aid decline its population 
has soared as many emigrant workers, ex-soldiers and rural migrants all sought 
to maintain, or improve their circumstances by moving to the capital. Further­
more, if the economic development of the country as a whole is to be essen­
tially autonomous and 1 self-centred1 and if confrontation with 'South Africa 
is to be resumed sometime in the future, then independent Mozambique might 
have tp ask if Maputo is well located sis the .capital, the major growth centre, 
and the principal recipient of investment. The answer must almost certainly . 
be in the negative; but geographical inertia, vested interests, and the 
actual processes of current and probable future growth suggest that, not­
withstanding its extreme southerly location on South Africa1s doorstep,
Maputo will continue to be the capital of Mozambique.
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